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Sarah M. Danno 
 
Global climate change and its chronic frustrations generated 
passage of the Massachusetts Global Warming Solutions Act. The 
Massachusetts Legislature imposed time-bound implementation mandates 
on the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection with 
Massachusetts residents acting as compliance watchdogs. In Kain, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts interpreted the Act in favor of 
environmental integrity and strict agency compliance standards. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Establishing a leading interpretation of the Massachusetts Global 
Warming Solutions Act (“Act”), Kain v. Department of Environmental 
Protection clarified the Massachusetts Department of Environmental 
Protection’s (“Department”) regulatory obligations.1 Massachusetts 
residents (“Plaintiffs”) argued the Department failed to comply with § 3(d) 
of the Act’s companion statute, which requires it to set a declining 
emission limit on greenhouse gas emitting sources.2 The Department 
relied on its prior adoption of three regulatory programs aimed at 
combating greenhouse gases to demonstrate its compliance with the Act.3 
The Superior Court of Massachusetts agreed that the Department’s actions 
substantially complied with the Act’s mandates and consequently ruled in 
its favor.4 Plaintiffs appealed and were granted direct appellate review by 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Upon review, the Supreme 
Judicial Court vacated the lower court’s judgment and determined the 
Department failed to set greenhouse gas emissions limits as required under 
the Act.5 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 The continuous rise of global climate concerns among 
Massachusetts residents  led the Massachusetts Legislature (“Legislature”) 
to enact solution-based legislation.6 Largely motivated by scientific 
analysis linking climate change to increased greenhouse gas emissions, the 
Legislature enacted “the most ambitious greenhouse gas reductions for a 
                                                     
1.  Kain v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 49 N.E.3d 1124, 1127 (Mass. 
2016). 
2.  Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 1127–1128. 
6. Id. at 1127. 
  
 
 
2 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 0 
single state in the entire country.”7 The Act specifically charged the 
Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs (“Secretary”), and his 
counterpart - the Department, with setting legally binding limits on 
identified emissions in Massachusetts.8 Additionally, § 6 of the Act 
established the Climate Protection and Green Economy Act (“Statute”), a 
companion statute placing specific time limits on the Secretary and the 
Department to implement the Act’s mission and goals.9  
 The Act’s goals are designed to be achieved through the Secretary 
and Department’s adherence to their prescribed regulatory duties.10 The 
mandated duties are sequentially organized to build upon themselves.11 
They include (1) establishing an emission reporting system, (2) 
determining current and prospective emission levels if “business as usual” 
management techniques are continued, (3) issuing statewide emission 
limits to achieve specified percentage emissions reductions, and (4), 
pursuant to Statute § 3(d), establishing regulations that provide for “a 
desired level of declining annual aggregate emission limits for sources or 
categories of sources that emit greenhouse gas emissions.”12 The 
Department met each of these duties except the final mandate’s deadline 
for establishing regulations on emission limits.13 
 The Department’s failure to meet the final mandate’s deadline 
induced the Plaintiffs to petition the Department and demand it establish 
emission-limiting regulations.14 In response, the Department held a public 
hearing and resolved it had complied with the Act’s mandates.15 The 
Department argued three regulatory measures it took to reduce emissions 
demonstrated such compliance—limiting sulfur hexafluoride leaks, 
placing a cap and trade market on carbon dioxide emissions, and 
establishing an automobile emissions reduction program.16 After the 
Department’s determination, Plaintiffs filed a complaint arguing the 
Department failed to meet its statutory requirements.17 
 Seeking declaratory relief or a writ of mandamus, Plaintiffs 
alleged the Department failed to fulfill its responsibility to establish 
emissions limits for greenhouse gas emitting sources under § 3(d).18 
Repeating its previous argument from the public hearing, the Department 
insisted it met these requirements through its implementation of the three 
                                                     
7.  Id. at 1129 (quoting the Executive Office of Energy & 
Environmental Affairs, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Global Warming Solutions 
Act 5-Year Progress Report at introductory letter from the Secretary).  
8. Id. at 1129–30. 
9. Id. at 1128–30. 
10.  Id. 
11. Id.  
12. Id. at 1130–31. 
13. Id. at 1131.  
14. Id. at 1127.  
15. Id. 
16. Id.  
17. Id.  
18. Id. 
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greenhouse gas limiting programs.19 The Superior Court ruled in the 
Department’s favor, finding that the regulatory programs “substantially 
complied” with the Department’s obligations under the Act.20 Plaintiffs 
appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the Court 
granted direct appellate review.21   
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided this case 
by interpreting the statutory language of § 3(d) which reads, “[t]he 
department shall promulgate the regulations establishing a desired level of 
declining annual aggregate emission limits for sources or categories of 
sources that emit greenhouse gas emissions.”22 Plaintiffs argued this 
language required the Department to enact regulations that set a precise 
annually declining limit on discharged emissions.23 The Department 
countered that it need only set “aspirational targets.”24 Further, it 
reasserted it met § 3(d)’s  requirements by implementing three greenhouse 
gas limiting programs.25 
The Court reviewed the Department’s statutory interpretation de 
novo and applied the general canons of statutory construction.26 In doing 
so, the Court considered both § 3(d)’s plain meaning and legislative 
evolution.27 This encompassed § 3(d)’s development, advancement 
through the legislature, contemporary history, earlier legislation, customs 
and conditions, and the overall scheme of positive law in which it exists.28 
 The Court concluded § 3(d)’s language was unambiguous and  
dismissed the Department’s argument as essentially undermining the 
integrity and intent of the Act.29 The Court began its analysis by 
interpreting the phrase “emission limits” with respect to both Plaintiff’s 
and the Department’s perspectives30. The Court applied two interpreting 
principles.31 The first principle called for a word’s meaning to remain the 
same when used in different parts of a statute.32 The second principle 
entailed utilizing a plain meaning approach to statutory language.33 The 
Court determined the provision’s plain language clearly intended 
                                                     
19. Id.  
20. Id.  
21.  Id.  
22.  Id. at 1131. (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21N, § 3 (West 
2008)). 
23.  Id.  
24.  Id. at 1131–1132. 
25.  Id. at 1132. 
26. Id.  
27. Id.  
28.  Id. (citing Oxford v. Oxford Water Co., 463 N.E.2d 330 (1984)).  
29. Id. at 1132. 
30.  Id. at 1132–1333. 
31. Id. at 1133. 
32. Id. 
33. Id.  
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“emissions limit(s)” to mean greenhouse gas emissions as shown by its 
direct reference to limits on sources emitting greenhouse gases.34 The 
Court added that the word “desired” in conjunction with the Act’s purpose, 
exhibited the Legislature’s intent that the Department should set actual 
limits to achieve emission reductions.35  
 The Court then analyzed § 3(d)’s remaining statutory language 
with a focus on interpreting “declining annual aggregate emission limits” 
for greenhouse gas emitters.36 The parties disagreed on whether the 
language required the Department to set limits on source-specific 
emissions as opposed to limits on source categories.37 The Court 
highlighted the provision’s use of the plural form when referencing 
“limits,” “sources,” and “regulations,” and held the Legislature intended 
the Department to regulate multiple sources of greenhouse gas emitters.38 
Additionally, the Court held the Act’s essential function would be 
displaced by limiting a single source or source category.39 The Court then 
applied a plain meaning approach to determine the Department was 
required to set annually declining source emission limits.40 
Upon clarifying the obligations of § 3(d), the Court determined 
the three greenhouse gas reduction programs implemented by the 
Department failed to meet § 3(d)’s directive.41 The sulfur hexafluoride 
program addressed leakage prevention from gas-insulated switchgear 
systems and set a maximum rate instead of a maximum limit.42 It did not 
meet the mandated “source-wide volumetric cap on emissions” required 
by § 3(d) because it failed to control the composite amount of leakage and 
was thus unable to achieve the Act’s mandated reductions.43  
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and carbon dioxide 
budget trading program was implemented under a separate statute and its 
goals and emission reductions were calculated into the “business as usual” 
baseline utilized in the Act.44 Further, the program could not achieve the 
emission reductions required by § 3(d) due to a carbon dioxide allowance 
component included in its framework.45 This component undermined § 
3(d)’s purpose by preventing the assurance of “mass-based” carbon 
dioxide emissions reductions.46  
Akin to the sulfur hexafluoride program, the Low Emission 
Vehicle program also failed to comply with § 3(d)’s requirements due to 
                                                     
34. Id. (emphasis added). 
35. Id. at 1134.  
36. Id. at 1135.  
37. Id.  
38. Id. (emphasis added).  
39. Id.  
40. Id. at 1136.  
41. Id.  at 1137.  
42.  Id. 
43. Id. at 1138.  
44. Id.  at 1140. 
45.  Id.   
46. Id. at 1140–1141. 
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its use of “rates” to establish emissions reductions as opposed to “limits”.47 
The program adopted strict vehicle emission standards, but its regulations 
failed to guarantee aggregate emissions reductions, a required component 
of § 3(d).48 For the foregoing reasons, each of the department’s 
implemented regulatory programs failed to meet § 3(d)’s demands.49 
Finding that the material facts of this case were undisputed and an 
actual controversy existed, the Court determined declaratory judgment the 
proper remedy.50 After completing its statutory interpretation of § 3(d), the 
Court remanded the case for judgment and declared that the Department 
must enact specific and measurable regulations directed at multiple 
sources or categories of greenhouse gas emitting sources.51 The 
regulations must limit the amount of emissions discharged by each source 
and the Department must place an annually declining limit on the 
aggregate emissions of those sources.52  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has proven to be 
an instrumental judicial body in global climate change litigation. The 
Court’s decision in Kain further demonstrates its inclination to adopt the 
policy of legislative intent over agency discretion. This case places strict 
legislative compliance on the Massachusetts Department of 
Environmental Protection and establishes a high standard for future 
agency action and statutory interpretation cases. While this decision may 
be regarded as a victory for the environmental movement, it is 
substantially reliant on the intent and expression of the Massachusetts 
Legislature. This decision has the potential to promote legislative clarity 
and empower other states to combat global climate change through 
legislative action.  
                                                     
47.  Id. at 1142. 
48. Id. 
49.  Id. 
50. Id. at 1128. 
51. Id. at 1142.    
52. Id.  
